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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






SAMUEL YAROSH, Jr.,  
both individually and derivatively on  
behalf of Fox Development, Inc.,  




CAROLE SALKIND; STEVEN SALKIND; MORTON SALKIND; PETER ROSEN;  
ROSEN & AVIGLIANO; BARBARA COHEN; JOHN HARRIS; MALLER, EDIDIN 
COMPANY, P.C.; ANSEL EDIDIN; INFRAME, INC.; DAN BATES; ULYSSES 
CORPORATION; LIBERTY SPEEDWAY; MAPLE INDUSTRIES; GIANT 




APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2-04-cv-01816) 
District Judge:  Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 17, 2013 
____________ 
 
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 







BARRY, Circuit Judge 
Samuel Yarosh, Jr., appeals the District Court’s grant of defendants’ motions for 
summary judgment as to his individual claims and his derivative claims on behalf of Fox 
Development, Inc. (―Fox‖) against Carole Salkind (―C. Salkind‖), Morton Salkind (―M. 
Salkind‖), Steven Salkind (―S. Salkind‖), Barbara Cohen, John Harris, John Quinn, 
InFrame, Inc., Dan Bates, Ulysses Corporation, Sabal Industries, Liberty Speedway, 
Maple Industries, Giant Associates, Acme Associates, Inc., and Leisure Heights, Inc.  We 
will affirm. 
I. Factual Background 
 On or about May 1, 1995, Yarosh met M. Salkind, an introduction arranged by 
Peter Rosen, Yarosh’s attorney.  At this meeting, or shortly thereafter, Yarosh and M. 
Salkind allegedly entered into an oral agreement to be equal partners in the development 
of a property in Rockaway Township known as ―Lot 48.‖  The development was to be run 
out of Fox, one of M. Salkind’s existing companies.  M. Salkind’s wife, C. Salkind, was, 
at all relevant times, the sole shareholder of Fox; M. Salkind, the sole Director; and C. 
Salkind and the Salkinds’ son, S. Salkind, Officers.  The claims in this case stem from the 
more than fifteen-year-old alleged oral agreement.   
  Yarosh originally planned to develop Lot 48 as a retail mall.  When Yarosh and 
M. Salkind were unable to secure the required zoning change for a mall, the two decided 
to develop Lot 48 as a senior housing development called ―Fox Hills.‖  From 1995 
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through 1997, Yarosh and M. Salkind worked on developing Fox Hills.  In 1997, 
Rockaway Township approved the construction of Fox Hills on Lot 48, and Yarosh and 
M. Salkind began selling units.  Construction on Fox Hills began on September 7, 1997.   
Yarosh alleges that throughout the period of their relationship, M. Salkind, at times 
with the assistance of other defendants, engaged in a scheme to defraud Yarosh of 
millions of dollars in profits from Fox Hills, loot Fox of its assets, unlawfully divert Fox 
funds to other persons and entities, alter Fox’s books, and invest the money diverted from 
Fox into purchases of real estate to the detriment of Yarosh and Fox.
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II. Procedural Background 
 Yarosh’s 33-count Second Amended Complaint asserted derivatively on behalf of 
Fox, and individually on his own behalf, federal claims under the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (―RICO‖), state RICO claims, and additional state 
tort and statutory claims.  On March 25, 2006, the District Court bifurcated the case and 
ordered that the first phase of discovery proceed only on ―the question of whether 
[Yarosh] either owned an equity interest in [Fox] as a shareholder, partner or otherwise, 
or was somehow cheated out of such an interest.‖  At the conclusion of phase one 
discovery, the parties moved for summary judgment.  Yarosh moved for partial summary 
judgment on the issue of shareholder status.   Defendants moved for summary judgment 
on all claims.  On August 19, 2008, the Court granted defendants’ motions for summary 
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 On May 28, 2008, M. Salkind pled guilty to tax evasion in connection with Fox’s tax 
filings.   
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judgment.   
Yarosh timely appealed. We stayed the appeal pending resolution of M. Salkind 
and C. Salkind’s bankruptcy proceedings.  On January 10, 2012, we lifted the stay after 
the Bankruptcy Court granted Yarosh’s motion for relief from the automatic stay in both 
bankruptcy proceedings so that this appeal could go forward, and because resolution of 
the bankruptcy proceedings is years away and, in any event, would likely have no impact 
on our decision.      
III. Standard of Review 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1965 and 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over Yarosh’s state claims.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the Court’s grant 
of summary judgment.   In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 916 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1990).  
Applying the same standard as applied by the District Court, we will affirm a grant of  
summary judgment only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
admissions, and affidavits, viewed with all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, 
show there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.   Fed. R. Civ .P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 330 (1986);  Azur v. Chase Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 
2010) .   
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IV. Analysis 
A. Derivative Claims  
A plaintiff bringing a derivative action on behalf of a corporation must allege that 
he or she was ―a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction complained of, or 
that [his] share or membership later devolved on [him] by operation of law.‖ Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23.1(b)(1);  Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 735 (3d Cir. 1970) 
(―[S]tock ownership in a corporation [is a] prerequisite for bringing a derivative action in 
its behalf.‖).   
Yarosh was never a shareholder of Fox and, therefore, lacks standing to bring 
derivative claims on its behalf.  Fox only ever had one shareholder—C. Salkind.  Yarosh 
admits he has no proof of stock ownership or a proprietary interest in Fox.  There is no 
stock certificate.  There is no written shareholder agreement.  There is no written 
agreement between Yarosh and M. Salkind defining Yarosh’s connection to Fox.  There 
is no Fox document listing Yarosh as an owner or possessing an ownership interest.  
Yarosh never spoke to C. Sikland about ownership and there is no documented request 
for a stock certificate or other written document evidencing an ownership interest.  There 
is no evidence Yarosh was ever represented to others as a shareholder or possessing an 
ownership interest, and in no personal document (e.g., tax return, financial statement, 
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personal loan) does Yarosh declare an ownership interest in Fox.
2
  
Yarosh has, therefore, failed to set forth any facts supporting even an inference 
that he was a shareholder.  He argues, however, that he was to be ―equal partners‖3 with 
M. Salkind under the terms of their oral agreement, which, in his view, meant a 50% 
ownership interest in Fox.  Yarosh’s purported understanding of ―equal partners‖ as 
involving an ownership interest, however, is belied by his own testimony distinguishing 
―partner‖ from ―shareholder.‖  Yarosh testified that when he discovered evidence of tax 
fraud and knew an IRS investigation was imminent, he ―[did] not want to be a 
shareholder.  [He] want[ed] to be a partner.  If [he] was a shareholder [he] would be 
involved with the IRS and the U.S. Attorney’s office, because [he] found . . . massive 
Internal Revenue fraud.‖  (J.A. 778).  He testified that before he discovered the fraud, he 
was asking for stock certificates, but stopped after becoming aware of the potential 
investigation because he feared liability and, thus, wanted no ownership interest in the 
company.   
Yarosh also contends that a $250,000 loan he made to Fox—and which was repaid 
with interest—was a shareholder loan and supports his purported ownership interest.  
There is no evidence that this was a shareholder loan.  The corporate tax forms Yarosh 
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 Furthermore, in unrelated collection proceedings, Yarosh claimed under oath that his 
relationship with Fox was that of an employer/employee and that his assets in Fox did not 
include an ownership interest.  (J.A. 1314–1318, 1320).    
3
 The original complaint only spoke of a ―partner‖ relationship between M. Salkind and 
Yarosh.  The Second Amended Complaint redefined their relationship as one of ―equal 
shareholders.‖ 
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points to list one lump sum for shareholder loans; the constituent loans are not delineated.  
To conclude that this shareholder loan line item includes Yarosh’s loan would be pure 
speculation.  
Finally, Yarosh states he was listed as a joint client with M. Salkind on Fox’s legal 
bills and was listed as a 10% owner of Fox on a Fox-drafted loan application.  Rosen, 
Fox’s attorney, testified that a client name is used only as a filing and reference aid and is 
of no consequence.  Rosen said he simply included Yarosh’s name because he often 
worked directly with Yarosh on Fox-related matters.  In terms of the document to which 
Yarosh refers, it was not a loan application at all but a proposal, and it was prepared by 
Summit Bank, not Fox.  Finally, and most importantly, it proposed that Yarosh guarantee 
10% of the loan; there is no mention of ownership.   
B. Individual Claims  
Yarosh also asserts that the District Court erroneously dismissed his individual 
claims and criticizes the Court for not providing separate analyses of his derivative claims 
and individual claims.  However, Yarosh himself failed to clearly separate his individual 
claims from his derivative claims in his 140-page Second Amended Complaint.  
Likewise, on appeal, he fails to even identify his individual claims, much less explain 
why their dismissal was erroneous.  Indeed, we are unclear what the individual claims are, 
much less if any of them remain following the dismissal of the derivative claims based on 
a finding of no ownership interest. Given this lack of clarity, we can no more perform a 
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separate analysis of the purported individual claims than could the District Court.     
VI. Conclusion 
 The Order of the District Court will be affirmed. 
 
